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Defendants Thomas Haughey and USI MidAtlantic, 
Inc. appeal a second time from a judgment entered against 
them in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  (Our earlier 
decision, to which we will refer as Graham I, is reported at 
568 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2009).) A jury found Haughey and USI 
liable for surreptitiously infringing the William A. Graham 
Company‘s copyrights over the course of more than a decade, 
and returned a verdict in Graham‘s favor totaling nearly $19 
million.  To this the District Court added an award of more 
than $4.6 million in prejudgment interest.  In the defendants‘ 
view, the jury verdict is so large as to shock the judicial 
conscience, and the prejudgment interest award is contrary to 
law.  We disagree with both contentions and will therefore 
affirm. 
I 
 In 1991, Haughey left his job with Graham, an 
insurance brokerage, for one with USI, a Graham competitor.  
When he changed employers, Haughey took with him two 
binders containing hundreds of pages of text describing 
various types of insurance coverages, exclusions, conditions, 
and similar matter.  These binders had been prepared by 
Graham employees and were subject to that firm‘s copyrights.  
From July 1992 until 2005, Haughey and the rest of USI 
made use of these materials in preparing insurance coverage 
proposals for presentation to their clients.  This use of 
Graham‘s creation constituted a long-running copyright 
violation, though not in the paradigmatic, ―direct,‖ 
reproduction-and-sale-of-protected-works form.  The 
infringement was instead ―indirect,‖ in that the defendants 
used the copyrighted materials without permission in order to 
sell their own insurance products.  This conduct was hidden 
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from view, and Graham apparently did not discover it until 
November 2004.   
On February 8, 2005, Graham filed suit against 
Haughey and USI under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 
et seq. The defendants raised the Act‘s three-year statute of 
limitations as a defense, but the District Court held that the 
―discovery rule‖—which tolls the limitations period until the 
plaintiff learns of his cause of action or with reasonable 
diligence could have done so—applied to the Copyright Act 
and therefore saved at least part of the complaint, subject to 
the jury‘s determination of when Graham should have learned 
of its cause of action. 
The case proceeded to trial.  Although the Copyright 
Act permits the plaintiff in an infringement action to recover 
either statutory damages or ―actual damages and any 
additional profits of the infringer,‖ 17 U.S.C § 504(a), 
Graham eschewed the statutory damages provision and did 
not claim to have suffered any actual damages.  It was 
therefore left to seek only the infringers‘ profits—that is, ―any 
profits of the infringer[s] that are attributable to the 
infringement.‖  Id. § 504(b).  To succeed on such a claim, a 
plaintiff is first required to prove the defendants‘ gross 
revenues over the course of the relevant time period, and then 
to establish a causal nexus between the infringement and the 
profits sought.  Graham I, 568 F.3d at 442 (citing Polar Bear 
Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 711 (9th Cir. 
2004)).  Graham proved gross commissions of about $32 
million for USI and $3 million for Haughey personally.  The 
jury also made the necessary causation finding.  
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Once the plaintiff has done its part, the burden shifts to 
the defense to prove that some of its revenues were 
―attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work,‖ and 
are therefore not recoverable.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  Graham 
conceded that 25 percent of USI‘s revenues were deductible 
expenses, reducing its potential recovery against USI to 
around $24 million.  From there, the defendants argued for 
further reductions to account for their own contributions to 
their success.  The jury credited these arguments in part, and 
accordingly awarded Graham $16,561,230 from USI and 
$2,297,397 from Haughey—representing about 70 percent of 
USI‘s profits, and 75 percent of Haughey‘s, over the course 
of the relevant time period.  The jury also found that Graham 
had not been on notice of the infringement prior to February 
9, 2002—which meant that no part of its claim was time-
barred. 
After the jury returned its verdict, the District Court 
determined, based on the trial evidence, that Graham had in 
fact been placed on inquiry notice of the defendants‘ conduct 
through the existence of ―storm warnings‖ as early as the fall 
of 1991.  The court therefore set aside the jury‘s verdict and 
held a second trial limited to damages that had arisen within 
three years of the commencement of Graham‘s action.  The 
second jury entered a verdict in the amount of $1.4 million 
against USI and $268,000 against Haughey. 
The parties cross-appealed.  Graham argued that the 
District Court‘s ―storm warnings‖ analysis was mistaken, and 
that the initial verdict should be reinstated.  The defendants 
argued that Graham had failed adequately to prove the 
requisite causal nexus.  We affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  Causation, we said, had been adequately proven at the 
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first trial.  Graham I, 568 F.3d at 442–43.  But while the 
District Court had correctly held that the discovery rule 
applied to Copyright Act claims, it had erred in finding 
―storm warnings‖ in the face of the first jury‘s well-supported 
conclusion that Graham could not reasonably have discovered 
the infringement at any time before February 9, 2002.  Id. at 
441.  We accordingly remanded the case for consideration of 
the defendants‘ argument that the 70 and 75 percent 
apportionments of their profits were unsupported by the 
evidence and that the verdict was therefore excessive. 
The District Court rejected the excessiveness argument 
and reinstated the original jury‘s verdict.  It also granted 
Graham‘s motion for prejudgment interest, which the court 
awarded in accordance with the calculations of Dr. Richard J. 
Gering.  Dr. Gering‘s report, the substance of which the 
defendants neither challenged nor rebutted, is premised on 
interest beginning to accumulate in 1992, when the first 
infringement occurred.  The defendants took exception to this 
choice of date, arguing that interest should have been 
awarded, if at all, only from the date in 2004 on which 
Graham discovered its cause of action.  They also asserted 
that prejudgment interest is not available in infringers‘-profits 
copyright cases, as a matter of law.  The District Court 
rejected these arguments and ordered interest awards totaling 
$4,112,859 against USI and $570,542 against Haughey.  
The defendants appeal, arguing both that the jury‘s 
verdict shocks the judicial conscience and that the 
prejudgment interest award is improper.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a); ours is 
premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II 
We first address the defendants‘ claim that the 
damages award is excessive.  This is a steep climb.  A district 
court‘s decision regarding a request for a remittitur is 
reversed only for abuse of discretion, and a case is remanded 
for a new trial ―only if the verdict is so grossly excessive as to 
shock the judicial conscience.‖  Gumbs v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 
823 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Tormenia v. First Investors Realty 
Co., 251 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2000).  The climb is made 
even steeper by the fact that the defendants bore the burden of 
proving the extent to which the verdict should be reduced to 
account for ―factors other than the copyrighted work.‖  17 
U.S.C. § 504(b).  In the ordinary remittitur case, an aggrieved 
defendant need ―only‖ show that the other side‘s evidence did 
not justify the award.  ―Grossly excessive‖ is a hard thing to 
show, but the defendant can proceed by demonstrating that 
his opponent‘s case is feeble, or that the damages are out of 
proportion to the actual injury.  Here, Haughey and USI are in 
the position of having to prove that the jury underweighted 
their own evidence to the point of shocking the judicial 
conscience. 
In making their case, the defendants emphasize the 
several months and hundreds of man-hours of research and 
relationship-building that precede every sale.  Before USI can 
earn a commission, a salesman has to know what risks to look 
for, discern which ones the prospective client faces, 
determine which underwriters are willing to insure those risks 
and at what prices, and develop a coverage scheme that he 
must then sell to the client.  This process requires detailed 
knowledge of the insurance industry and the sorts of products 
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that are available, and demands that the salesman establish his 
credibility and trustworthiness through face-to-face meetings 
and sales pitches.  All this effort, the defendants insist, 
accounts for the vast majority of their earnings.  Furthermore, 
they argue that only relatively small portions of the text of the 
written proposals was lifted from the copyrighted materials, 
and that much of this was boilerplate that cannot have had a 
large influence on their clients‘ coverage-purchasing 
decisions.
1
   
We have some sympathy for the argument that these 
efforts accounted for more than 25 or 30 percent of the 
defendants‘ earnings (though the defendants coyly decline to 
say just how much more).  Any such sympathy is not, 
however, sufficient to justify overturning the jury‘s verdict.  
Graham has pointed to substantial evidence of its own that 
supports the conclusion that the misappropriated documents 
were an important element of the defendants‘ overall sales 
strategy.  Use of standardized, well-thought-out language 
allows salespeople to demonstrate credibility, knowledge of 
their insurance products, and understanding of the businesses 
and risks being insured.  As the District Court noted, ―the 
[w]orks were virtually the only source of written insurance 
policy explanations within USI.‖ Graham‘s eponymous 
principal testified that his firm ―would not have been 
successful without these documents.‖  Parts of the 
                                              
1
 The defendants also assert that the verdict includes 
damages based on revenue arising from non-infringing proposals 
or sales made without proposals.  Properly understood, this 
concerns not apportionment but the causal link between some part 
of the damages award and the defendants‘ infringement.  This 
court already rejected the causation argument on the defendants‘ 
initial appeal.  See Graham I, 568 F.3d at 442–43. 
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copyrighted materials described in some depth the various 
forms of coverage that a client might want to purchase, and 
would have been quite valuable to a salesman needing to 
explain and summarize his offerings. All of USI‘s account 
managers had access to copies of the books Haughey had 
pilfered from Graham, and support staff were explicitly 
reminded to make use of them.  USI hired a temporary 
employee to type the contents of the two huge binders into a 
word processing program so that the text could be 
electronically referenced and easily copied into new 
documents.  The defendants made use of Graham‘s language 
in some 857 sales proposals prepared for 315 different clients 
over the course of thirteen years.  If that were not enough, the 
defendants willfully destroyed a number of pre-1995 
documents relevant to the case after being ordered by the 
court to preserve them.  This entitled Graham to a spoliation 
instruction (which the defendants have not appealed) allowing 
the jury to infer that in its early years the infringement was 
actually more widespread than the evidence at trial showed. 
The ―shocks the conscience‖ or ―miscarriage of 
justice‖ standard for a grant of a new trial exists ―to ensure 
that a district court does not substitute its judgment of the 
facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury.‖  
Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 
1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This concern is even more pressing at the appellate 
level, where the judges have not had the opportunity to 
observe the trial.  In light of the conflicting evidence that we 
have just outlined, a ruling for the defendants here would 
constitute an impermissible substitution of the court‘s 
assessment of the facts for the jury‘s.  The verdict does not 
shock the judicial conscience and will be affirmed. 
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III 
Defendants raise several arguments against the District 
Court‘s award of prejudgment interest.   Specifically, they say 
that interest is not available under the Copyright Act; that 
even if it is, it should not be granted in infringers‘-profits 
cases; and that in any event it should not have begun to 
accumulate in this case until Graham had actually discovered 
the infringement.   
A 
Although Congress has not enacted express statutory 
authorization for prejudgment interest, see S. Rep. 97-275, at 
11–12 (1981); Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 
330, 339 n.8 (1988), its silence is of no moment.  ―Far from 
indicating a legislative determination that prejudgment 
interest should not be awarded, . . . the absence of a statute 
merely indicates that the question is governed by traditional 
judge-made principles.‖  City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., 
Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995).  Similarly, the 
fact that Congress amended the Patent Act in 1946 to provide 
for prejudgment interest, see 35 U.S.C. § 284, says nothing 
about how we should interpret the Copyright Act.  Although 
patents are analogous to copyrights, the fact is that the Patent 
Act amendment was a direct reaction to a series of cases 
requiring exceptional circumstances for an award of 
prejudgment interest covering the period of time preceding 
liquidation of damages.  See GM Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 
U.S. 648, 651–53 (1983).  There is no analogous line of 
decisions in the copyright context, and therefore no reason for 
Congress to have amended the Copyright Act in response to a 
perceived problem in its judicial interpretation.   
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In point of fact, this court‘s precedents indicate that 
congressional silence favors permitting prejudgment interest 
awards.  It is a ―long-standing‖ rule of our federal common 
law that, ―in the absence of an explicit statutory command 
otherwise, district courts have broad discretion to award 
prejudgment interest on a judgment obtained pursuant to a 
federal statute.‖  Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 372 
F.3d 193, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Pignataro v. Port 
Auth., 593 F.3d 265, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming this 
rule and indicating that interest ―should be awarded based on 
considerations of fairness‖).  Of course, when the federal 
courts engage in the development of gap-filling common law, 
we must do so with the statute‘s policy goals in mind.  See, 
e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947) 
(―[I]n the absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest on 
such obligations, this Court has fashioned rules which granted 
or denied interest on particular statutory obligations by an 
appraisal of the congressional purpose in imposing them and 
in the light of general principles deemed relevant by the 
Court.‖) (citations omitted); Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 206.  So if 
it were the case that the purposes of the Copyright Act ran 
counter to those of prejudgment interest awards, a rule against 
interest might be appropriate. 
Reviewing those two sets of purposes, we find that 
they are well aligned with one another.  According to the 
relevant House Report, the aims of the Copyright Act‘s 
damages-plus-profits provision are two-fold: ―Damages are 
awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from 
the infringement, and profits are awarded to prevent the 
infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.‖  H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 161 (1976).  See also, e.g., Polar Bear 
Prods., 384 F.3d at 718 (―[T]he purpose of § 504(b) is to 
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compensate fully a copyright owner for the misappropriated 
value of its property and ‗to avoid unjust enrichment by 
defendants, who would otherwise benefit from this 
component of profit through their unlawful use of another‘s 
work.‘‖) (citation omitted).  Far from being contrary to these 
goals, the purposes of prejudgment interest—―making the 
claimant whole and preventing unjust enrichment‖—parallel 
them exactly.  Fotta v. Trs. of the UMW Health & Ret. Fund 
of 1974, 165 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 1998).  Although interest 
may allow an injured party to recoup the time-value of his 
loss, its usefulness is not, as the defendants would have it, 
confined to the provision of just compensation.  Requiring 
only that a losing defendant pay back the principal amount of 
a wrongfully obtained sum permits him to retain the money‘s 
time-value as a windfall in the form of an interest-free loan.  
See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Certainteed Corp., 835 F.2d 474, 
478 (3d Cir. 1986).  The defendants‘ insistence that a plaintiff 
seeking to recover an infringer‘s profits, as Graham does, 
should not receive interest because he ―has suffered no loss at 
all‖ is therefore unpersuasive, for interest is just as 
appropriate to achieve full disgorgement as to ensure just 
compensation.   
Given our general rule permitting interest awards and 
the consistency of that rule with the Copyright Act‘s 
purposes, the defendants are left with few straws at which to 
grasp.  Seizing on language in the House Report to the effect 
that § 504‘s purpose was to give courts ―unambiguous 
directions concerning monetary awards,‖ H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 161, they assert that Congress intended to limit the 
forms of available relief to those it specifically enumerated—
that is, statutory damages, actual damages, and/or the 
infringers‘ profits, full stop.  But they have not bothered to 
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quote the very next clause of the sentence on which this 
argument is based, which advises that the Act was intended 
―to provide the courts with reasonable latitude to adjust 
recovery to the circumstances of the case, thus avoiding some 
of the artificial or overly technical awards resulting from the 
language of the existing statute.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  The 
statute was not meant to circumscribe the courts‘ authority on 
the subject of interest awards; it certainly did not do so 
explicitly. 
 The defendants finally argue that the procedures 
applicable in infringers‘-profits cases make an interest award 
inappropriate.  Specifically, they cite the Act‘s burden-
shifting scheme and the fact that the measure of damages is 
determined through the ―inherently arbitrary and artificial‖ 
process of submission to a jury.  But regardless of who bears 
what burden, the jury system is the process by which courts 
typically determine facts, including the measure of copyright-
related profits and attribution percentages.  A jury‘s verdict in 
a case like this one is an assessment of the degree to which 
the defendants have illegally enriched themselves.  Nothing 
about such a finding or the process through which it comes 
about contradicts the aims to be achieved through an award of 
prejudgment interest.   
 The defendants‘ arguments have not persuaded us that 
our usual rule should not apply to copyright cases generally 
or to infringers‘-profits cases in particular.  Furthermore, we 
think it self-evident that, as between a copyright owner and an 
infringer, the former has the stronger equitable claim to the 
time-value of income derived from his creation.  We therefore 
hold that prejudgment interest is available in copyright cases 
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at the District Court‘s discretion, exercised in light of 
―considerations of fairness.‖  Pignataro, 593 F.3d at 274.  
B 
 The defendants‘ sole remaining opportunity to reduce 
their liability is their argument that the District Court 
calculated its interest assessment improperly by counting 
from the date in 1992 on which the first infringement 
occurred rather than from the date in 2004 when Graham 
discovered it.  The basis for this argument is the interplay 
between our prior holding in this case to the effect that, under 
the ―discovery rule‖ Graham‘s cause of action did not 
―accrue‖ for statute of limitations purposes until it discovered 
its injury, see Graham I, 568 F.3d at 433–41, and the 
Supreme Court‘s statement in West Virginia v. United States 
regarding the period during which interest is awarded:  
―Prejudgment interest serves to compensate for the loss of use 
of money due as damages from the time the claim accrues 
until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full 
compensation for the injury those damages are intended to 
redress.‖  479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987) (emphasis added).  
The defendants argue that, if the claim did not accrue until 
2004 and the interest clock does not start ticking until accrual, 
interest should not have begun to accumulate until 2004.  This 
syllogism rests on a misapprehension of the nature of the 
discovery rule—albeit one that is quite common and that we 
ourselves have, unfortunately, helped to propagate. 
 In keeping with West Virginia, we determine the date 
on which to begin counting interest by asking when the claim 
in question accrued.  As a general matter, a cause of action 
―accrues‖ when it has ―come into existence as an enforceable 
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claim or right.‖  Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).  
Stated another way, accrual is ―[t]he event whereby a cause of 
action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can 
begin and maintain his cause of action.‖  Ballentine‘s Law 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1969).  ―‗Accrue‘ derives from the Latin 
words ‗ad‘ and ‗creso,‘ to grow to; thus it means to arise, to 
happen, to come into force or existence.‖  Strassburg v. 
Citizens State Bank, 581 N.W.2d 510, 514 (S.D. 1998) (citing 
Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Ore. 1966); Black‘s 
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1968)).  This is an objective feature 
of any extant claim: the question is whether all of its elements 
have come into existence such that an omniscient plaintiff 
could prove them in court.  At that point the cause of action is 
―complete,‖ and has therefore accrued.  Thus the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently stated that ―a cause 
of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first 
maintained the action to a successful conclusion.‖  Fine v. 
Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 2005).  And in Delaware, ―a 
cause of action ‗accrues‘ . . . at the time of the wrongful act, 
even if the plaintiff is ignorant of the cause of action.‖  Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 319 
(Del. 2004) (citations omitted).  See also, e.g., Stokes v. Van 
Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 1999) (a claim ―accrues at 
the time it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the 
claim is in such a condition that the courts can proceed and 
give judgment if the claim is established‖) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Wittmer v. Ruegemer, 419 
N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 1988) (accrual is the point at which 
―the action can be brought without being subject to dismissal 
for failure to state a claim‖)  (citation omitted); Aetna Life & 
Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 492 N.E.2d 386, 389 (N.Y. 1986) (―The 
Statute of Limitations begins to run once a cause of action 
accrues, that is, when all of the facts necessary to the cause of 
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action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to 
obtain relief in court.‖) (citations omitted); Robinson v. 
Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. 1977) (―For the purposes of 
application of statutes of limitations, a cause of action 
generally can be said to accrue at the time when facts come 
into existence which authorize a claimant to seek a judicial 
remedy.‖) (citation omitted).  Accrual has to do with the 
existence of a legally cognizable right to obtain a judicially 
sanctioned remedy, not the practical capacity to file a lawsuit. 
This definition fits nicely with the purposes of 
prejudgment interest.  As West Virginia indicated, such 
interest is often aimed at ―achieving full compensation for the 
[plaintiff‘s] injury.‖  479 U.S. at 310 n.2.  Complete redress 
will require that interest cover the entire period of the injury‘s 
existence, which implies that injury and accrual generally 
happen at the same time.  The Court has elsewhere suggested 
as much.  See Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001) 
(indicating that prejudgment interest should be awarded, in 
appropriate cases, ―from the time of injury‖).  Similarly, in 
cases where the goal is the defendant‘s disgorgement rather 
than rectification of the plaintiff‘s injury, fully attaining the 
goal of prejudgment interest will require that it be awarded 
from the date of the first illicit profit.  To generalize, for 
prejudgment interest to fully serve its purpose, it needs to be 
awarded from the date on which the plaintiff first had a right 
to collect the principal sum—that is, the date of accrual, as 
that term has traditionally been defined.  If this is the right 
way to determine the accrual date—and thus the date on 
which interest began to accumulate—then the District Court 
was correct in awarding interest from the first infringement. 
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 To obtain relief from the District Court‘s judgment, the 
defendants must therefore argue for some other method of 
determining the date on which Graham‘s cause of action 
accrued.  To that end, they cite Graham I‘s articulation of the 
―discovery rule‖ as a doctrine that delays the date on which a 
cause of action accrued.  For reasons that we shall explain, we 
conclude that this was a mischaracterization.  
Accrual, as we have said, occurs once events satisfying 
all the elements of a cause of action have taken place.  At that 
point, the period prescribed by the applicable statute of 
limitations ordinarily begins to run—time begins to count 
against the plaintiff, such that if enough of it goes past he can 
no longer obtain relief.  See, e.g., Fine, 870 A.2d at 857 
(―[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right 
to institute and maintain a suit arises.‖).  There exist, 
however, various statutory and judge-made rules that operate 
to toll the running of the limitations period—that is, ―to stop 
[its] running‖; ―to abate‖ it, Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed.), 
supra, or ―[t]o suspend or interrupt‖ it, Ballentine‘s Law 
Dictionary, supra.  These tolling doctrines include those for 
infancy, see, e.g., Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 640–41 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (discussing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)), the 
pendency of a class action which includes absent class 
members‘ claims, see In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 
275, 299 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing  Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551, 553 (1974)), and the dictates of 
equity, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 
U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008) (statutes of limitations ―typically 
permit courts to toll the limitations period in light of special 
equitable considerations‖ unless the particular statute is 
deemed ―jurisdictional‖).  Time that passes while a statute is 
tolled does not count against the limitations period.  This can 
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operate to exclude a chunk of time in the middle of the 
limitations period—the clock could start, then stop when a 
class action is filed, and then start again once certification is 
denied.  Perhaps more frequently, a tolling rule directs the 
court to ignore time at the beginning of the limitations 
period—an infant in Pennsylvania is not affected by any 
statutory time limit until he achieves the age of majority 
(though he could theoretically file suit before that date).  This 
latter form of tolling has the same practical effect, for 
limitations purposes, as a delay in the accrual of the cause of 
action: either way, time does not count against the limitations 
period until some event external to the cause of action has 
occurred. 
The discovery rule has been characterized both as 
delaying the accrual of a cause of action and as tolling the 
running of the limitations period.  See 4 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 & nn.43.1–43.2 (3d 
ed. 2002 & Supp. 2010).  The distinction between the two 
concepts is ―often confusing,‖ id., but because it makes no 
difference for purposes of deciding whether a claim survives 
a statute-of-limitations defense, the question has rarely been 
analyzed with semantic precision. For instance, none of the 
myriad decisions forming the genealogy of Graham I‘s 
statement that the discovery rule pertains to accrual defines 
precisely what it means for a cause of action to accrue; nor do 
they explain why accrual rather than tolling is the relevant 
concept.  See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008); Romero v. Allstate 
Corp., 404 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); Union Pac. R.R. v. 
Beckham, 138 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1998); Connors v. 
Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 
1991); Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1991); 
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Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 
1990); Corn v. Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 588 (11th 
Cir. 1990); Alcorn v. Burlington N. R. Co., 878 F.2d 1105, 
1108 (8th Cir. 1989); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 
F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988); Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 
600, 606 (5th Cir. 1988); Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
823 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1987); Alexopulos v. S.F. Unified 
Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987); Cullen v. 
Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 725 (2d Cir. 1987); Norco Constr., 
Inc. v. King Cnty., 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Dowty v. Pioneer Rural Elec. Coop., 770 F.2d 52, 56 (6th Cir. 
1985); Shapiro v. Cook United, Inc., 762 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 
1985); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612, 614 
(11th Cir. 1984); Metz v. Tootsie Roll Indus., 715 F.2d 299, 
304 (7th Cir. 1983); Trotter v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & 
Warehousemen’s Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 
1983); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 159 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Singleton v. New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Young v. Clinchfield R. Co., 288 F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 
1961).  In the main, these courts simply had no need to 
discuss the issue in depth, because it held no practical import 
for the results in the cases before them.  The Eighth Circuit in 
Alcorn, for example, asserted that ―[a] limitations period 
accrues when a claimant knows, or should know through an 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of the acts constituting the 
alleged violation.‖  878 F.2d at 1108.  But this statement 
cannot be correct.  A limitations period does not accrue: it 
neither ―come[s] into existence as an enforceable claim or 
right,‖ Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed.), supra, nor 
―become[s] complete,‖ Ballentine‘s Law Dictionary, supra.  
A limitations period runs, and after some period of time it 
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expires.  The Seventh Circuit‘s opinion in Cada suggests 
similar confusion: the court declared that ―[a]ccrual is the 
date on which the statute of limitations begins to run.  It is not 
the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs, 
but the date—often the same, but sometimes later—on which 
the plaintiff discovers that he has been injured.‖  920 F.2d at 
450.  This has it backwards.  As we explained above, accrual 
is defined in terms of the objective existence of a viable cause 
of action, not in terms of whether the limitations clock has 
started.  It happens to be the case that the limitations period 
generally commences once a claim exists, but a running clock 
is not the sine qua non of accrual.   
Even the Supreme Court has on occasion confused the 
two concepts.  In Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, --- U.S. ---, 130 
S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (2010), the Court described the discovery 
rule as ―a doctrine that delays accrual of a cause of action 
until the plaintiff has ‗discovered‘ it.‖  As with the court of 
appeals cases just discussed, Merck was not concerned with 
the precise mechanics of the discovery rule.  It dealt only with 
the meaning of the word ―discovery‖ in the general federal 
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, and did not consider 
the question we now address.  Indeed, a close reading of § 
1658 reveals that the Court‘s statement regarding the 
discovery rule was not grounded in rigorous analysis.  
Subsection (a) states, in accordance with ordinary limitations 
rules, that ―[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil 
action arising under an Act of Congress . . . may not be 
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action 
accrues.‖  Subsection (b) then goes on to enact a partial 
discovery rule: 
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Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right 
of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of 
a regulatory requirement concerning the 
securities laws . . . may be brought not later 
than the earlier of— 
    (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation; or 
    (2) 5 years after such violation. 
The statute provides an extended limitations period in a 
certain class of cases.  It does not alter the date of accrual, but 
operates ―[n]otwithstanding‖ the fact that the cause of action 
has already accrued.  The Court‘s suggestion to the contrary 
is neither technically accurate nor necessary to its holding. 
Given the unimportance of the difference between 
tolling and delayed accrual to the outcomes of the various 
decisions cited above and the consequent failure of so many 
courts to recognize the distinction, we do not regard their 
articulations of the meaning of the discovery rule to be 
anything more than nonbinding obiter dicta.  Moreover, we 
are unaware of any decision considering the precise argument 
that the defendants have raised here.  We therefore address 
what we conclude is the correct meaning of the discovery 
rule, and its application to this case, starting from a more or 
less blank slate. 
This being another question of federal common law, 
we turn again to the usual tools of judicial decisionmaking, 
beginning with the ordinary legal definitions of the terms 
involved.  Accrual happens at the moment when events 
fulfilling all the elements of a cause of action have transpired.  
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But, with rare and irrelevant exceptions (for instance, a false 
imprisonment case where the plaintiff is not actually harmed, 
see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35), knowledge of an 
invasion of one‘s rights is not something that a plaintiff must 
prove in order to prevail.  To be sure, by the time a case goes 
to trial the plaintiff will know what has happened to him, or 
(if the named plaintiff is incompetent) he will be imputed 
with knowledge; but we do not ordinarily dismiss a complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to allege knowledge.  In 
order to defer accrual, the discovery rule would have to add 
an additional component to the substantive definitions of the 
claims to which it applies. That simply cannot be right.  Rules 
regarding limitations periods do not alter substantive causes 
of action.  Accordingly we do not think the discovery rule 
should be read to alter the date on which a cause of action 
accrues. 
Since it cannot be an accrual doctrine, the discovery 
rule must instead be one of those legal precepts that operate to 
toll the running of the limitations period after a cause of 
action has accrued, as sundry cases have stated.  E.g., 
Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (―The discovery rule, of course, tolls the statute of 
limitations until a plaintiff acquires sufficient information, 
which, if pursued, would lead to the true condition of 
things.‖) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 187 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(―The so-called ‗discovery rule‘ provides that the limitations 
period is tolled until ‗events occur or facts surface which 
would cause a reasonably prudent person to become aware 
that she or he had been harmed.‘‖) (citation omitted); Fine, 
870 A.2d at 858 (The discovery rule ―act[s] to toll the running 
of a statute of limitations,‖ that is, ―to exclude from the 
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running of the statute of limitations that period of time during 
which a party who has not suffered an immediately 
ascertainable injury is reasonably unaware he has been 
injured, so that he has essentially the same rights as those 
who have suffered such an injury.‖); Wal-Mart, 860 A.2d at 
319 (―Even after a cause of action accrues, the ‗running‘ of 
the limitations period can be ‗tolled‘ in certain limited 
circumstances.  Under the ‗discovery rule‘ the statute is tolled 
where the injury is ‗inherently unknowable and the claimant 
is blamelessly ignorant of the wrongful act and the injury 
complained of.‘‖) (citations omitted); Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 
P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998) (―[I]n certain circumstances the 
discovery rule may operate to toll the period of limitations 
until the discovery of the facts forming the basis for the cause 
of action.‖) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
This conclusion fits with the usual definitions of ―toll‖ and 
―accrue,‖ as we have explained, but its appeal does not end 
there.   
To cast the discovery rule as changing the date of 
accrual, so as to delay the onset of interest charges, would 
warp its fundamentally plaintiff-friendly purpose.  The rule is 
an exception to the usual principle that the statute of 
limitations begins to run immediately upon accrual regardless 
of whether or not the injured party has any idea what has 
happened to him.  It is grounded in the notion that it is unfair 
to deny relief to someone who has suffered an injury but who 
has not learned of it and cannot reasonably be expected to 
have done so.  Treating the discovery rule as altering the date 
of accrual would turn it into a means for defendants to protect 
themselves from having to fully compensate plaintiffs‘ losses 
and disgorge their own wrongful gains.  It would, moreover, 
give defendants additional incentive to conceal their tortious 
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or otherwise illegal acts: a fraudster would owe no interest on 
his purloined cash until discovery of the theft, and would thus 
be allowed to benefit from an interest-free loan.  This is 
emphatically not what the discovery rule is designed to do. 
We hold that the ―accrual‖ of a cause of action occurs 
at the moment at which each of its component elements has 
come into being as a matter of objective reality, such that an 
attorney with knowledge of all the facts could get it past a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The federal 
discovery rule then operates in applicable cases to toll the 
running of the limitations period.  Prejudgment interest, 
however, may be awarded in appropriate cases from the 
initial accrual date. 
Applying this holding to the present case, we conclude 
that Graham‘s copyright infringement claim accrued in 1992, 
when the first infringement took place.  The limitations 
period was then tolled until Graham discovered the 
infringement in 2004.  The District Court acted within its 
discretion when it assessed prejudgment interest beginning in 
1992.   
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IV 
Having thus decided that the verdict is not conscience-
shocking and that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion or commit any other reversible error, we will 
affirm its judgment in all respects.
2
   
                                              
2
 The defendants have renewed their argument that the 
discovery rule ought not apply to this case at all.  Graham I 
decided that issue against them, 568 F.3d at 437, and the 
defendants acknowledge that they have raised it here only for 
purposes of preserving it for a future certiorari petition.  Even were 
we to revisit the question, we would reaffirm the prior panel‘s 
decision. 
